!. THE HAZARD
[n practically all of its various forms, petroleum is potentially hazardous to the envi ronment. As a result, virtually every activity engaged in by the petroleum industry can have profound environmental implications. For many years, environmental considerations have played a role in decisions regarding the siting of petroleum production, refining, or storage facilities. Recent case law and regulatory developments in "environmental justice," however, assure that environmental considerations that affect minority communities will play an increasingly critical economic role in both the permitting process and, perhaps most importantly, the permit renewal process. This article discusses the recent developments, suggests preventive management techniques to deal wi th the new challenges, and proposes a better process of environmental justice io order to benefit minority populations living near the sites. The article will accomplish this by addressing the legal and regu latory environmental barriers to the petroleum site pennitting and renewal process, reviewi ng the Environmental Protection Agency's "environmental justice" compliance guidance, and suggesting pre-permit management techniques to educate citizens of the affected community so as to minimize the hidden contingent costs of "envirorunental justice" complaints. Few contemporary issues are more emotionally charged than environmentalism and its underlying values.
Legitimate policy controversies are generally portrayed as battles between victimized citizens and corporate polluters. [n tbis context, it is difficult not to side with the environmentalists. ' This contexl, however, often represents a mi sleading and false dichotom y, w hich may actually operate to direct beneficial soci al and economic resources away from the pOOf, minority conununities that the regulations were intended to benefit.
1 It is reasonable to assume that the type of community most likely to accept a new factory would he a town where more jobs are needed and increased tax revenue from the facility would benefit the area. There is scant evidence that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") takes into aCCOW'lt the wishes or needs of the affected minority conununi ty in the decision making process.) Decision makers must be aware that their good faith moti ves and community s upport for a facility may not be delenninalive w ith government regulators and Lhe courts .
Ill. STUDIES
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of empirical studies purported to find evidence of enviromnental injustice. One of the first studies exam ined populatio n data for Houston, Texas area communities
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where landfill s and incinerators were located . 4 The stud y concluded that minority neighborhoods supported a disproporti onate number of waste facilities. s A second study. conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1983, analyzed population demographics in communities adjacent to waste facilities in the Southeast. 6 This study also reported that a disproportionate number of such facilities were located in minority andlor poor conununities. 7 Another frequently c ited ~tudy was published by the Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ in 1987.' It too reported evidence of envirorunentaJ racism. 9 Although many of these studies have been frequently cited in order ( 0 bolster the positio n taken by advocates of the envi ronmental justice cause, some experts have questio ned tbe resu hs of (he studies on the basis of methodological Oaws. One such problem has to do with the studies' definition for " minority communiti es" which classifies any comm uni ty as a minority community if it has a higher proportion of nonwhite residents than that reflected in national statistics. to As a result, the studi es categorize some communities as "minority" even if they have a large majority of non-minority residents. A related problem is that the studies focus on the minority proportion of the population in high pollution areas, rather than population densities. As a result, the studies ignore the actual number of minority or low-income residents exposed to hazardous waste. II Still another potenti al flaw of these studies is the potential for significant aggrega ti on error resulting from defining geographic areas too broadly.l! These studies have also fai led to consider the timing of hazardous material sitings relat ive to shifts in the population . I) In other words, due to (1983) . 1 
See generally id. ' THE. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRJST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE. T OXIC WASTES ANO
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL R E.PORT ON THE RACIAL AND SO(lO ECONOM IC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZA RDOUS WASTE SITES ( 1987).
'I Set generally id. 10 
See laura Pulido, A Critical Review 0/ the Methodology of E"vir(lnmt!nraf Racism
Research, 28 AN TIPODE 142 ( 1996) . II Dynamics?, l03 YALE LJ. 1383 , 1385 ( 1994 .
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[VoL 24 : 67 the dynamic narure of the housing market, population shifts toward a higber proportion of minority and/or poor residents may have occurred after the siting of hazardous material facilities in some iocations.
14 In fact, one article suggests that economic factors , not environmental racism, are the real cause of the observed population differences surrounding hazardous materials facilities." Another problem with much of the environmental justice research is that the studies focus exclusively on the number of facilities located in minority/poor neighborhoods, failing to consider the amount and type of pollution actually involved. I f>
IV. A DEFINITION
The Envirorunental Protection Agency defines environmental justice as fair treatment for people of all races. cultures, and incomes, regarding the development of environmental laws, regulations , and policies.
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Since the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the incidence of claims that minority and low income popUlations bear a di sproportionate amount of negative health and environmental effects from po llution , often as a result of environmental racism-the intentional siting of hazardous waste facilities in predominately minority and low-income areas.
IS Now the President, the EPA, and the courts have acted to expand greatly the definition of "environmental justice" to include not only the evi ls of intentional discrimination, but also unintended "disparate impact" discrimination. ' 9 Disparate impact discrimination flow s from practices that are not intended to di scriminate. but for some reason have an unintended, but d iscriminatory, disparate effect on a protected c1ass.20 For example, an employer may have a policy that it only hires the relatives of current employees. Well-intentioned reasons may exist for this policy, such as increasing employees ' loyalty to and knowledge of the company. 
14 In fact, one article suggests that economic factors, not environmental racism, are the real cause of the observed popul atio n differences surrounding hazardous materials facilities." Another problem with much of the environmental justice research is that the studi es focus exclusively on the number of facilities located in minority/poor neighborhoods, failing to consider the amount and type of pollution actually involved. I f>
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The Envirorunental Protection Agency defines environmental j ustice as fair treatment for people of all races. cultures, and incomes, regarding the develop ment of environmental laws, regulations , and policies.
11
Since the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the incidence of claims that minority and low income popUlations bear a di sproportionate amount of negative health and environmental effects from po llution, often as a result of environmental racism-the intentional siting of hazardous waste facilities in predominately minority and low-income areas.
IS Now the President, the EPA, and the courts have acted to expand greatly the definition of "environmental justice" to include not only the evi ls of intentional di scrimination, but also uni ntended "disparate impact" discrimination. '9 Disparate impact discrimination flow s from practices that are not intended to di scriminate. but for some reason have an unintended, but d iscriminatory, disparate effect on a protected c1 ass.20 For exampl e, an employer may have a policy that it only hires the relatives of current emp loyees. Well-intentioned reasons may exist for this policy, such as increasing employees' loyalty to and knowledge of the company. (asserting discriminatory impact of police appointments made based on wriner examination scores); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985) (claiming that limitatiOl on number of allowed hospital days funded under Medicaid has a disproportionate arH discri.minalory effect on the handicapped). )) 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cit. 1997) .
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VI. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
The first critical qu e!ition is whether private individuals or environmental activists have an implied private cause of action in fed eral court to challenge the pennitting and permit renewal process without first exhausting available remedies with state or federal permitting agencies.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided an affinnative answer to this question when it di scovered that a private cause of action does exist to cballenge the pJant pennitting process.
lI In February 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency seized the initiative when, citing the President ' s Executive Order, it issued a po licy statement in the fotTIl of an interim guidance that clearly recognizes a private cause of action in both initial site permitting. and more surpri singly, the pennit renewal processes."l!I
Both the court decision and the EPA interim guidance are rooted in an interpretation ofThe Ci vil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act"). '" Title VI of the Act says that "no person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin , be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fmancial ass istance. "3l Whether the Act infers a private right of action in an environmental siting case has been the subj ect of considerable conjecture. o1
V II. THE C HESTER CASE AN D PRIVATE PERMIT CHALLENGES
When decided, Chester Residents Concerned f or Quality Living v. Self J) was widely regarded as having the same effect on environm ental 11 See Chester R(:sidents Concerned for Quality Li vlng v. Sei(, 132 F.3d 925, 932·37 (3d Cir. 1997) .
:>9 See INTERiM GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 3. 30 42 U. S.C. § § 2000d § § to 200Od-7 (1994 . (asserting discriminatory impact of police appointments made based on wriner examination scores); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985) (claiming that limitatiOl on number of allowed hospital days fund ed under Medicaid has a disproportionate arH discri.minalory e ffect on the handicapped). )) 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cit. 1997). law as the Brown v. Board of Education )4 desegregation case did on education law. Although the appeal of the Chester decision was recently vacated by the U.S . Supreme Court as moot because the contested facility decided to surrender the challenged pennit in question,H the initial decision provides a valuable roadmap to follow for courts evaluating private causes of action . It is beneficial to understand the case because the theory espoused by the court is recognized by other federal circuits, is ciled in EPA permitting regulations, and cases like it will surely arise agam .
In Chesler, the appellate court dealt with the issue of whether a private cause of action exists under Title vr to challenge the pennitting process.
''The City of Chester is located in Delaware County. Pennsylvania, and has a population of approximately 42,000, of which 65% is black and 32% is white. Delaware County, excluding Chesler, has a population of about 502,000 ofwruch 6.2% is black and 91 % is w hite."J7 The environmental group, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, contended that state and environmental authorities had granted five waste fac ility permits for sites in the City of Chester si nce 1987, while only granting two pennits for sites in the rest of Delaware County. It further alleges that the Chester facilities have a total permit capacity of 2.1 million tons of waste per year, while the non-Chester facilities have a total permit capacity of only 1,400 tons o f waste per year?'
The court was faced with the question of whether a private ri ght of action exists under the Discriminatory Effect Regulations promulgated by a federal administrative agency (EPA) On appeal, the Third Circuit decided that in the absence of a specific statutory authorization, there is a three-pronged test to detennine when it is appropriate to imply a private right of action to enforce government regulations. 43 The test requires the court to detennine "(1) 'whether the issue is properly within the scope of the enabling statute'; (2) 'whether the statute under which the rule was promulgated properly pennits the implication of a private right of action'; and (3) 'whether implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the enabling statute. ",44
The appellate court said that " [ t ] here [was] no question that the EPA's discriminatory effect regulation satisfies the first prong.,,45 The court also said it is clear that "'actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [ can] be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purpose of Title VI. ",46 Announcing that the second and third prongs detennined whether a private right of action existed,47 the court found that it had to consider the relevant factors of "(1) whether there is 'any indication of legislative intent, explicit and implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one'; and (2) whether it is 'consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. nle court reviewed the law and regulations and agreed that there was some weight to the argument that the EPA, or a state pennitting agency, acts only "as a gatekeeper to enforcement, with private parties submitting their allegations to the agency and its discretion.'",9 The court failed to enlighten the litigants by citing any explicit examples of a legislative intent to confer a private cause of action. $O It decided that private lawsuits arc consistent with the underlying legislative scheme of Title yr." The court also said that a private right of action is desirable "because it will deputize private attorneys general who will enforce section 602 and its implementing regulations"jl and will further the purposes of Title VI.5)
The foregoing decision should serve as a signal to those involved The Agency announced a five-step framework for determining whether a disparate impact exists that is subject to this private cause of action. 55 The steps are:
(1) To identify the population affected by the permit that triggered the complaint. The affected popUlation is that which suffers the adverse impacts of the permitted activity; (2) To determine the racial and/or ethnic composition of the affected population; (3) To identify which other permitted facilities, if any, are to be included in the analysis and the racial and/or ethnic composition of the popUlation already affected by those permits. This is referred to as the universe of facilities; (4) To conduct a disparate impact analysis to determine whether persons protected under Title VI are being impacted by the facility at a disparate rate. The EPA expects the rates of impact for the protected popUlation and comparison populations to be relatively comparable; and (5) To use arithmetic or statistical analysis to determine whether the disparity is significant under Title VI. After calculations, the EPA may make a prima facie disparate impact finding, subject to the recipient's opportunity to rebut.
56
The recipient will have an opportunity to 'justify" the decision to issue a permit, based on legitimate, substantial interests of the recipient, notwithstand ing the resulting disparate impact.
57 Demonstrati ng that the permit complies with applicable environment al regulations will not ordinarily be considered a legitimate justification . 58 Rather, an articulable value to the recipient must be found. 59 The types of factors that will be considered in determining the sufficiency of the justification can include the seriousness of the disparate impact, whether the permit is a renewal (with demonstrate d benefits) or for a new facility (with more speCUlative benefits), and whether any of the articulated benefits associated with the permit can be expected to assist the affected minority community that is a subject of the complaint. Another section of the Guidance should be of even greater concern to all managers involved in de<:isions to seek permit renewals. In the section "Investigations of Allegedly Discriminatory Pennit Renewals," th e Guidance provides:
Generally, permit renewals should be treated and analyzed as if they were facility permits. since permit renewal is, by definition, an occasion to review the overall operations of a permitted facility and make any ne<:essary changes. Generally, pennit renewals are not issued without public notice and an opportunity for the public to challenge the propriety of granting a renewal under the relevant environrnentallaws and regulations.
6J
The potential legal and management impact of the Guidance is enormous because it is clearly relevant to pennit renewals. Consequently, under the Guidance, disparate. impact claims may be brought directly in federal court long after permits have been issued . Jeopardizing existing permits by giving retroactive reach to environmental justice claims is likely to cause considerable reluctance in related capital investment decisions. Although unfortunate, a likely result is the abandorunent of otherwise benefi cial economic development in (he same minority and low income communities that Title VI was intended to benefit.~l [n fact, Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer is pushing to scale back federal involvement in envi rorunental justice cases because he wants to attract industry to minority neighborhoods . Another section of the Guidance should be of even greater concern to all managers involved in de<:isions to seek permit renewals. In the section "Investigations of Allegedly Discriminatory Pennit Renewals," th e Guidance provides:
The potential legal and management impact of the Guidance is enormous because it is clearly relevant to pennit renewals. Consequently, under the Guidance, disparate. impact claims may be brought directly in federal court long after permits have been issued . Jeopardizing existing permits by giving retroactive reach to environmental justice claims is likely to cause considerable reluctance in related capital investment decisions. Although unfortunate, a likely result is the abandorunent of otherwise benefi cial economic development in (he same minority and lowincome communities that Title VI was intended to benefit.~l [n fact, Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer is pushing to scale back federal involvement in envi rorunental justice cases because he wants to attract industry to minority neighborhoods . 
DEC1SIONS
The "minority community economic development be damned" approach is illustrated by the EPA's Shintech decision in February 1998." This case illustrated that a pennit already granted by Louisiana's Department of EnvironmentaJ Quality could be delayed.
67
The stated reason was that polluting industries locate in minority areas because their residents are powerless to stop them. The action was taken despite local NAACP polls that showed that seventy-three percent of the black residents of Convent favored the plant location.6&
According to a lawyer representing town residents, the EPA and opposing nonresident activists also ignored the favorable opinions of all the locany elected black officials.
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The community residents were excited because the average wage paid by Shintech was $12.00 to $L5.00 per hour compared to the prevailing community wages of $6.00 per hour. 70 Shortly after the EPA 's decision, Shintech abandoned lhe project and moved to another location.11
The Shin tech decision has generated considerable criticism from governors, mayors, and chambers of commerce because it is viewed as failing to follow the interim guidance by taking into account the demonstrated economic benefits of the facility for the community.ll Sadly '''when government actions are driven by public perception and pressure groups, those actions generally are responding to middle class concerns and ignoring the problems of the poor. 
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The Shin tech decision has generated considerable criticism from governors, mayors, and chambers of commerce because it is viewed as failing to follow the interim guidance by taking into account the demonstrated economic benefits of the facility for the community.ll Sadly '''when government actions are driven by public perception and pressure groups, those actions generally are responding to middle class concerns and ignoring the problems of the poor. A result favorable to industry was handed down in an October 30.
1998, decision concerning Select Steel Corporation .7< In Select Steel, the EPA' s Office of Civil Rights careful1y fcHowed the fi ve~step framework previously discussed. 's The private complaint charged that the Michigan Department of Environment Quality' s permit for a steel recycling mill would lead to a discriminatory, disparate impact on minority residents in Genesee County.76 The EPA followed the interim guidance 's framework by determining the affected population,77 determining the demographics of the affected population,'S determining the universe of the faciliti es and the total affected population, and conducting a disparate impact analysis. 7' 9 The EPA found that there was no affected population that suffered "adverse" impact5 within the meaning of Title VI.1O The EPA dismissed the private complaint. ' • T he decision was obviously influenced by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's careful investigati on of the permit application tbat generally followed the EPA's guidance. The decision signals that a permit applicant that initially applies the interim guidance's five·step approach in preparing the application will like ly receive a reasoned response from Ute EPA.
X. M ANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IsSUES
Taken together, the president's executive order, the phi losophy of the Chester case recognizing a private cause of action, the EPA 's interim guidance for investigating Title VI private administrati ve complaints challenging pennits, and the EPA's application o f the Guidance fore tell an explosion of regulatory and judicial activity in site permitting and renewals. All parties involved. including managers, controllers, investors, creditors, and auditors would be wise to consider the impact o f these developments. These developing concerns must be carefully managed. First, the five·step framework established by the interim guidance and the Genesee County.76 The EPA followed the interim guidance 's framework by determining the affected population,77 determining the demographics of the affected population,'S determining the universe of the faciliti es and the total affected population, and conducting a disparate impact analysis. 7' 9 The EPA found that there was no affected population that suffered "adverse" impact5 within the meaning of Title VI.1O The EPA dismissed the private complaint. ' • T he decision was obviously influenced by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's careful investigati on of the permit application tbat generally followed the EPA's guidance. The decision signals that a permit applicant that initially applies the interim guidance's five·step approach in preparing the application will like ly receive a reasoned response from Ute EPA.
Taken together, the president's executive order, the phi losophy of the Chester case recognizing a private cause of action, the EPA 's interim guidance for investigating Title VI private administrati ve complaints challenging pennits, and the EPA's application o f the Guidance fore tell an explosion of regulatory and judicial activity in site permitting and renewals. All parties involved. including managers, controllers, investors, creditors, and auditors would be wise to consider the impact o f these developments. These developing concerns must be carefully managed. First, the five·step framework established by the interim guidance and the • An evaluation of the population of the city and county surrounding the property in question to determine the racial and ethnic composition that will be affected by the permit.
• A survey and evaluation of other plant sites and facility permits in the city and county.
• An evaluation of the impact of those facilities and pefltlits on the protected classes of race, color, national origin, or low-income populations; and, • A disparate impact analysis to determine whether protected persons affected by the new facility will suffer a disparate impact and whether the impact is significant. Even if disparate impact is found, bear in mind that the pennit may still be "justified" based on a legitimate, substantial interest of the recipient. Factors that may be considered are the seriousness of the disparate impact, whether the permit is a renewal (with demonstrated benefits). or, perbaps most importantly, whether the articulated benefits can be expected to assist the minority community.83 Sllreiy, as Mayor Dennis Archer advocates, jobs and tax revenues can be considered a substantial benefit. ~ One olher very practical concern that is not often addressed is how to educate the affected community about the facility and its impact on them.
BS Many applicants for pennits allow activists with no cOIU1ection to the conununity to capture the issue and dominate the discussion.
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"Environmental activists tend to be white, middle-aged, middle-class professionals-not young, blue collar workers or blacks." 87 They often do not reflect the concerns of the poor minority residents. How then do you beat the activists to the hearts and minds of citizens of the affected community? One often overlooked way is to utilize Section 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA,, Recall that the EPA decision in Select Steel complimented the Michigan state agency for essentially following the interim guidance. So the following, at a minimum, should be accomplished prior to requesting a permit:
• An evaluation of the population of the city and county surrounding the property in question to determine the racial and ethnic composition that will be affected by the permit.
"Environmental activists tend to be white, middle-aged, middle-class professionals-not young, blue collar workers or blacks." 87 They often do not reflect the concerns of the poor minority residents. How then do you beal the activists to the hearts and minds of citizens of the affected community? One often overlooked way is to utilize Section 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA,, 
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focuses on "productive harmony" as the goal of federal actions, including "social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.'~ The section advocates the importance of citizen participation and perspective through an interactive, integrated process to improve final deci si ons, and discovering the ''widest range of beneficial uses of the envirorunent .'J90 A way to preempt and manage intrusion has been developed by the environmental consuJti ng finn of James Kent and Associates of Aspen. Colorado.
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By going into the community and infonnaHy identifying the leaders and disruptive issues prior to the permitting process, the finn helps its clients avoid the kind o f activist interference that evolved in the Shintech case.'1! Pre·penni t application contact with community members prov ides opportunities to integrate the project successfully with local leaders and networks.
9l
The communi ty contacts allow the pennit applicant to institute " issue tracking" mechanisms so citizens can understand how their interests are being addressed, thereby building p ubli c support for the project and focusing decision making on the informed interests of the community .~ Recognizing the values of the local community allows for the social and physical environment to be linked together into a plan that will accommodate their interests and achieve the "productive hannony" contemplated by section 101 o f the Act.
9
} Such action will signal to the regulators that the pennit applicant is accommodating the "community interests" and. as in the SeLect Steel case, is likely to receive a favorable response fTom the regulators.% focuses on "productive harmony" as the goal of federal actions, including "social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.'~ The section advocates the importance of citizen participation and perspective through an interactive, integrated process to improve final deci si ons, and discovering the ''widest range of beneficial uses of the envirorunent .'J90 A way to preempt and manage intrusion has been developed by the environmental consuJti ng finn of James Kent and Associates of Aspen. Colorado.
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Some might express concern about the costs associated with initially following the five-step framework of the interim guidance 97 or the section 101 citizen participation advocated by the Kent firm.98 The alternative, however, of a contested pennit surely is much more costly in terms of money, personnel, and resources. The funds expended on pre permit management is money well-spent. In addition, business decision makers w ill find that community support makes for a smoother transition in other, non-environmental facets of siting a facility in a new town. Jt is in a business' best interest to get the community involved, and the diminution of a threat of a suit is just one of many reasons for better COITIIDlUlity involvement XI. PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES Another way to manage the problem might be to encourage petroleum companies to reward or compensate communities for hosting a facility such as an oil refinery. A compensation system ensures that all who benefit from the facility pay the full cost that the facility imposes on society.99
However, there are philosophical difficulties with "encouraging" companies to pay commwtities for foisting oil refining facilities on them. First of all, such "encouragement" often translates into the legal obligation for finns to make pay-offs at some point in time for such purposes. After all, if it is sound public policy to "encourage" the petroleum industry to compensate host communities, it will reasonably be asked why thi s should not be formalized in law. Moreover, suppose an oil refiner refuses to do that which it is "encouraged" to do. This would promote uneven results, and the calls to require tbat finns live up to their compensatory duty will be overwhelming.
Secondly, and more basically, the direction of compensation is by no means clear. There is indeed a case for forcing (or "encouraging'') an oil company to make a payment to the locality. After all, operating in that vicinity will help the finn, or it would not have chosen to locate there. On the other hand, the town gains as well, or it would not welcome the company with open anTIS. More to the point, the people in the area benefit from this commercial immigrant.
With regard to paying this 97 See supra text accompanying note 56. Some might express concern about the costs associated with initially following the five-step framework of the interim guidance 97 or the section 101 citizen participation advocated by the Kent firm.98 The alternative, however, of a contested pennit surely is much more costly in terms of money, personnel, and resources. The funds expended on prepermit management is money well-spent. In addition, business decision makers w ill find that community support makes for a smoother transition in other, non-environmental facets of siting a facility in a new town. Jt is in a business' best interest to get the community involved, and the diminution of a threat of a suit is just one of many reasons for better COITIIDlUlity involvement XI. PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES Another way to manage the problem might be to encourage petroleum companies to reward or compensate communities for hosting a facility such as an oil refinery. A compensation system ensures that all who benefit from the facility pay the full cost that the facility imposes on society.99
With regard to paying this 97 See supra text accompanying note 56. can offer wages below, equal to, or in excess of, those already prevailing. If the oil company proffers less salary than presently being earned by the local workers. they will spurn this opportunity. Even a roughly comparable salary (with due consideration given to the non·monetary aspects of the job) will likely be insufficient to woo them away from their present employment; why leave your job for something that is not preferable in any way? Only if the wage and working conditions package is beneT than those already prevailing wiLL the new corporation be able to attract a labor force. Typically, the improvement must be substantial to overcome the status quo. 1OO Thus, if there is any compensating to be done, there is at least as good a case that the local community should be compensating the petroleum firm; the direction of compensation should actually be reversed.
But all talk of compensation , in either direction stems from economic illiteracy. All commercial interaction, whether in the goods or labor markel, is mutually beneficial in the ex ante sense. Both parties to a trade expect to gain from it in some fonn, and this is their motivation for entering into a transaction. Suppose, for example, that a housewife purchases a fish for $4. She would not have done so if she places a value on this item of less than this amount. Assume that she values it at $5 .
Then she earns a profit of $1 on the deaL But the identical reasoning applies on the other side of the equation. The retailer would never have sold the fish at thi s price unless he valued it at less than this amoWlt. Let us suppose that he assigned a value to it of $3. Then he eams a profit of $1 on the exchange. So, who should compensate whom for this sale? The entire question is ludicrous. Both gain from it. 10 1 It is the same with the location of the o il tndustry in the 10\Vn~ there is no warrant for compensation in ei ther direction, for the market is a mutually beneficial institution.
! (kl As we hav~ seen, the pay offered by Shintech was about $ 15.00 per hour compared 10 the prevailing $6.00 community wage. 101 In the ex ante sense, that is. In the ex poST sense, the housewife may later leam that ~T family had fish for lunch, and doesn 't want to eat it for dinner as well . can offer wages below, equal to, or in excess of, those already prevailing. If the oil company proffers less salary than presently being earned by the local workers. they will spurn this opportunity. Even a roughly comparable salary (with due consideration given to the non·monetary aspects of the job) will likely be insufficient to woo them away from their present employment; why leave your job for something that is not preferable in any way? Only if the wage and working conditions package is beneT than those already prevailing wiLL the new corporation be able to attract a labor force. Typically, the improvement must be substantial to overcome the status quo. 1OO Thus, if there is any compensating to be done, there is at least as good a case that the local community should be compensating the petroleum firm; the direction of compensation should actually be reversed.
But all talk of compensation, in either direction stems from economic illiteracy. All commercial interaction, whether in the goods or labor markel, is mutually beneficial in the ex ante sense. Both parties to a trade expect to gain from it in some fonn, and this is their motivation for entering into a transaction. Suppose, for example, that a housewife purchases a fish for $4. She would not have done so if she places a value on this item of less than this amount. Assume that she values it at $5 . Then she earns a profit of $1 on the deal. But the identical reasoning applies on the other side of the equation. The retailer would never have sold the fish at thi s price unless he valued it at less than this amoWlt. Let us suppose that he assigned a value to it of $3. Then he eams a profit of $1 on the exchange. So, who should compensate whom for this sale? The entire question is ludicrous. Both gain from it. 10 1 It is the same with the location of the o il tndustry in the lo\Vn~ there is no warrant for compensation in ei ther direction, for the market is a mutually beneficial institution.
! (kl As we hav~ seen, the pay offered by Shintech was about $ 15.00 per hour compared 10 the prevailing $6.00 community wage. 101 In the ex ante sense, that is. In the ex poST sense, the housewife may later leam that ~T family had fish for lunch, and doesn 't want to eat it for dinner as well . Had sbe known that, she would Dot ba v~ made the pUIcbase for any positive price. Thus. she loses her entire expenditure. Similarly. a fish shortage might suddenly ensue, driving the markel price of fish up to $50. The seller, then, would greatly r~gret his precipitate sale.
The ex ante gains from trade are always positive. necessarily so. Ex pOSl. they are o nl y usually positive. depending on the sk.ilts of the market participants.
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Suppose, however, that there is a winner and a loser. While this cannot occur ex ante, it certainly could take place ex post, For example, suppose the seller, but not the housewife, later comes to regrd his decision. That is, the price of fish rises to $50 right after the sale at $5 takes place, and the fish monger comes running after the housewife, demanding compensation (or a rescission of the sale). What are we to make of such a claim? It is abject nonsense, since the conunercial interaction was "for keepsies" in the terminology of the playground, and not unilaterally revocable.10'l. The bottom line here, is that it is a misunderstanding of the market to think. that compensation should be "encouraged" or legally mandated just because gains from trade are made. Gains from trade are always made in the free market, and by both sides. If compensation had to be made under such conditions, the death knell of free enterprise would begin to toll.
XII. VOTE WITH FEET
We have seen above that, according to an NAACP poll in Lo uisiana, seventy-three percent of the black residents favored a new oil industry plant in their town. 10) Some people may object and argue that there are falsehoods in polls. Similarly, the views of black politicians welcoming Shin tech may also be disparaged by left wing env ironmentalists 1 within the EPA noting that elected officials are chosen (14 on the basis of many criteria. Therefore, their views on any one issue such as siting a plant may not be representative of those of their constituents . 'o~ .0: Similarly, it would be just as wrong to "encourage" or force, the fishmonger to rerum Ule housewife 's money \0 ber if sbe later came to regret her purcbase, say, because her family was tired offish. Now it might be that the seller will do this in any case, in order to keep a loyal customer, e.g., for the good will involved. But it should be no part of public policy to "encourage" bim to do so, and certainly not to require any such act on his part. 10J See Payne, supra note 63, at A22. 1001 "Left wing environmentalist" is by no means a tautology, nor, by the same token. is "free market environmentalisl" an oxymoron. For instances of the Janer, see generally •0' It is interesting to compare the dollar vote of the marketplace with the ballot bOl( vote of the political system in this regard. 10 the latter, "conswners" are allowed to express themselves on ly once every two or four years; in the fonner , every day. 10 the politicaJ system, the choice is limited to a "package deal." One must vote for C linton or Busb [Vol. 24: 67
We have seen above that, according to an NAACP poll in Lo uisiana, seventy-three percent of the black residents favored a new oil industry plant in their town. 10) Some people may object and argue that there are falsehoods in polls. Similarly, the views of black politicians welcoming Shin tech may also be disparaged by left wing env ironmentalists 1 (14 within the EPA noting that elected officials are chosen on the basis of many criteria. Therefore, their views on any one issue such as siting a plant may not be representative of those of their constituents . 'o~ .0: Similarly, it would be just as wrong to "encourage" or force, the fishmonger to rerum Ule housewife ' s money \0 ber if sbe later came to regret her purcbase, say, because her family was tired offish. Now it might be that the seller will do this in any case, in order to keep a loyal customer, e.g., for the good wi ll involved. But it should be no part of public policy to "encourage" bim to do so, and certainly not to require any such act on his part. 10J See Payne, supra note 63, at A22. 1001 "Left wing environmentalist" is by no means a tautology, nor, by the same token. is "free market environmentalisl" an oxymoron. For instances of the Janer, see generally • 0' It is interesting to compare the dollar vote of the marketplace with the ballot bOl( vote of the political system in this regard. 10 the latter, "conswners" are allowed to express themselves on ly once every two or four years; in the fonner , every day. 10 the politicaJ system, the choice is limited to a "package deal." One must vote for C linton or Busb But there is one indication of black acceptance of the "environmental racism" of plant location in their areas which cannot so easily be dismissed: "voting with one's feet ."
Consider again the fact that black response to hazardous material sittings has been to move toward these locations after they have been set Up. l06 This shows, perhaps in a way that no other evidence can, the true evaluation on the part of poor blacks of these plant locations; it is one of enthusiastic approbation.
It was no coincidence that there was only one-way Jewish traffic with regard to Nazi Gennany in the late 1930s; no Jews wanted to enter, all wanted to leave. Similarly, immi gration in the 1950s was to the U.S.
and from Cuba, not the other way around . Likewise, the movement across the Berlin Wall was from East to West, no t from West to East.'01 Another indication of when:: life was better concerned blacks in the U.S. south during the Jim Crow decades. Very few moved from Detroit, C hicago, New York and Philadelphia to Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas; the overwbelm ing majority moved in the opposite direction, The point is, when people are free to migrate. can telephone or write encouraging messages to their friend s and family still "back home." and the migration continues. this is some of the strongest evidence we have as social scientists that geographical relocalion is an irnprovement. 101 But there is one indication of black acceptance of the "environmental racism" of plant location in their areas which cannot so easily be dismissed: "voting with one's feet ."
and from Cuba, not the other way around . Likewise, the movement across the Berlin Wall was from East to West, no t from West to East.'01 Another indication of when:: life was better concerned blacks in the U.S. south during the Jim Crow decades. Very few moved from Detroit, C hicago, New York and Philadelphia to Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas; the overwbelm ing majority moved in the opposite direction, The point is, when people are free to migrate. can telephone or write encouraging messages to their friend s and family still "back home." and the migration continues. this is some of the strongest evidence we have as social scientists that geographical relocalion is an irnprovement.
